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The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integra-
tion of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which 
the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, 
are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its 
economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus tre-
at the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development 
of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in 
Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influ-
ence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. 
While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the pro-
ject is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the politi-
cal systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, 
and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over 
the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. 
The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically 
attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political 
dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its func-
tioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the 
other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that 
if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly 
dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal 
culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the 
EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR. 
The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was 
launched on 1 January 2015. It marks the third 
stage of the Russian-driven process of eco-
nomic, but de facto political integration in the 
post-Soviet area. The creation of the EEU was 
preceded by the establishment of the Customs 
Union (on 1 January 2010) and the Common 
Economic Space (on 1 January 2012). The new 
organisation, which unlike its predecessor, has 
legal personality, consists of Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus, which have participated in the 
integration process from the start, as well as 
Armenia, which joined them on 2 January 2015. 
Kyrgyzstan is also expected to become a mem-
ber this May, once all the required procedures 
are completed.
An economic bridle
In the economic dimension, the establishment 
of the EEU formally represents a step forward 
towards a new stage of integration, but it is not 
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a breakthrough. The EEU’s founding treaty pro-
vides for more freedom of movement of goods, 
services, capital and workers, and lays down 
more detailed and extensive regulations for 
the sectors that have already been integrated. 
In 2016, common regulations for the market in 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices will come 
into force. In some cases, the EEU will retain the 
members’ sovereignty in domains that have not 
hitherto been regulated because of their eco-
nomic sensitivity (e.g. in the policy of non-tariff 
regulations in relations with third countries). 
Contrary to previous declarations, regulations for 
the most contentious domains have been post-
poned: this concerns the creation of a common 
market for oil and gas (postponed until 2025), 
common market for electricity (postponed until 
2019) and the common market for services (post-
poned until 2025)1. A common transport market 
(for motor vehicles and rail) is to be created in 
several steps. The fact that those sectors have 
once again been exempted from integration un-
der transitory provisions demonstrates that the 
interests of the participating countries are still 
divergent, and the EEU members are reluctant to 
integrate those branches of the economy which 
are of strategic significance, especially those stra-
tegically important for Russia. The fact that no 
agreement has been reached in those domains is 
also due to the excessively rapid tempo of nego-
tiations, which has been imposed by Russia and 
criticised by the other members. 
The EEU retains the original principles of tar-
iff policy, which are in keeping with the terms 
of Russia’s accession to the WTO, including 
the provisions on sharing revenue from import 
duties and co-ordinating measures to sup-
port exports of goods from the EEU members 
(such as export loans, brand promotion, joint 
presences at fairs and exhibitions). A new la-
1 By a decision of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council 
adopted on 23 December 2014, the common market in 
services will include the sectors of construction, whole-
sale and retail trade and agriculture as of 1 January 2015. 
bel of ‘made in the EEU’ has been introduced 
(modelled on the EU solution). The EEU mem-
bers will also retain their original prerogatives 
concerning the pursuit of their own industri-
al policies and the protection of their econo-
mies through various subsidies, although these 
need to be agreed with the EEU Commission. 
The integration goes deepest in the area of al-
lowing citizens of the EEU member states free 
access to labour markets. The treaty expands 
the list of professions (e.g. by including edu-
cation and the legal professions) in which the 
member states will mutually recognise degrees 
on an automatic basis. Income tax will be paid 
in the country of residence from the first day 
of employment (hitherto, the figure was 183 
days). The treaty also guarantees equal access 
to basic medical care to all citizens of the mem-
ber states. Work is underway on an agreement 
to recognise work experience, and on the acqui-
sition of pension rights by workers employed in 
the member states. 
Despite such progress, the expected direct 
economic benefits from integration will be 
limited, due to the differences in the member 
states’ economic potentials, and the fact that 
the creation of the common market in oil and 
gas and the common market in electricity, both 
which are of key importance for the partners, 
has been postponed2. Trade exchange between 
the EEU’s founding countries accounted for 
only 12% of their total trade in 2012 and 2013 
2 In 2013, energy resources and energy products account-
ed for 43% of the trade exchange between member 
states of the Customs Union.
The fact that those sectors have once 
again been exempted from integration 
under transitory provisions demonstrates 
that the interests of the participating 
countries are still divergent.
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(11% in the first half of 2014)3. Moreover, due 
to the differences in economic potentials, the 
nature of trade exchange, and finally Russia’s 
central geographical position in the EEU, in-
tegration will in fact strengthen the network 
of bilateral economic relations between the 
member countries and Russia4. Even if Belarus 
and Kazakhstan are willing to increase their 
economic co-operation, they cannot do so on 
a wider scale for various reasons, including the 
fact that it is impossible to transit Kazakh oil to 
Belarus via Russia. 
The creation of the EEU will consolidate the 
existing system of economic dependencies, 
and open only narrow opportunities for inte-
gration in new areas. In the cases of Belarus 
and Armenia, the EEU preserves the existing 
system whereby Russia has been subsidising 
their economies, mainly through the supplies 
of cheaper energy resources – a benefit that 
has become less attractive in view of the pres-
ent economic situation (low oil prices and 
changes to the taxation of the oil sector in 
Russia5) – and through loans granted by Rus-
sia and the Russian-dominated Eurasian De-
velopment Bank. Russia’s decision to offer 
preferential terms of co-operation to Belarus6, 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (at the level of bilat-
eral economic relations with Russia) was the 
price that the Kremlin agreed to pay for involv-
ing those countries in the integration process.
3 Member states of the Common Economic Space (the 
predecessor of the EEU) accounted for 51% of the for-
eign trade of Belarus in 2013 (49% in the first half of 
2014), 18% (15%) of the foreign trade of Kazakhstan, 
and only 7.5% (7%) of the foreign trade of Russia.
4 For example, Russia accounted for 96.5% of Kazakh-
stan’s total trade exchange with the EEU countries be-
tween January and October 2014 (data from the Statis-
tical Committee of Kazakhstan).
5 Ewa Fisher, Szymon Kardaś, ‘„Manewr podatkowy”w rosy-
jskim sektorze naftowym’, Analizy OSW, 24 November 2014. 
6 Belarus received US$450 million in loans from the Rus-
sian government during the last few months before the 
signature of the EEU treaty alone (and the total amount 
is expected to reach US$2 billion), as well as two bridg-
ing loans of US$2 billion and US$440 million from the 
Russian state-controlled VTB bank.
In the case of Kazakhstan, its participation in the 
Eurasian Economic Union exposes the country 
to growing competition from stronger Russian 
companies on its domestic market, and makes 
the Kazakh oil sector less attractive to foreign 
investors. As the manufacturing base in the EEU 
countries is underdeveloped and obsolete, the 
creation of a common market will in fact facil-
itate the access of goods from Russia (whose 
industry is the most developed among them) 
to the markets of the other member states, and 
not the other way around (this tendency is cur-
rently being reinforced by the depreciation of 
the Russian currency). Belarus is an exception 
here, because nearly 50% of its exports go onto 
the Russian market. Moreover, the higher capi-
tal potential which Russian companies dispose 
leads to fears that they might buy out the most 
attractive enterprises in the smaller and eco-
nomically weaker member states. 
Participation in the EEU, which is dominated by 
the backward Russian economy, will not gen-
erate any impulses towards modernisation, is 
not conducive to a diversification of markets, 
and conserves the existing, uncompetitive eco-
nomic mechanisms. As a result, the EEU will 
only strengthen mutual dependencies, con-
solidating the trend whereby the problems 
of the EEU’s economically strongest member, 
i.e. Russia, spill over to the other member coun-
tries (for instance, the depreciation of the rou-
ble has been driving pressures towards devalu-
ation in Belarus and Kazakhstan). 
The EEU will only strengthen mutual de-
pendencies, consolidating the trend 
whereby the problems of the EEU’s eco-
nomically strongest member, i.e. Russia, 
spill over to the other member countries.
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The institutional and legal dimension 
of the EEU – effective dysfunction 
The creation of the EEU formally closes the 
process of forming the institutional bases for 
the integration process, which was launched 
in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs 
Union. The new organisation is not based on 
a new legal basis but on the existing legal ac-
quis, which has been expanded, re-ordered and 
formulated in more detail in the EEU Treaty7. 
The operation of the EEU is based in principle 
on already existing institutions, which have 
been equipped with additional prerogatives. 
The novelty consists in the fact that the EEU 
now has legal personality. 
The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council 
remains the EEU’s highest body (at the presi-
dential level) and unanimously defines the di-
rections of co-operation. The task of the newly 
created Eurasian Intergovernmental Council 
(at the prime ministerial level) is to supervise 
the implementation of the treaty’s provisions 
and of the decisions taken by the presidents. 
The Eurasian Economic Commission, head-
quartered in Moscow, is the permanent execu-
tive body of the Eurasian Economic Union. The 
Commission consists of a Council (a political 
organ made up of four deputy prime ministers, 
which acts in a supervisory role) and a College 
(an executive body). The Commission’s Coun-
cil adopts its decisions by consensus, while 
7 The treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Union 
was signed in Astana on 29 May 2014. It consists of four 
chapters: Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(I), Customs Union (II), Common Economic Space (III) 
and Final and transitory provisions (IV). 
the College does so by a qualified majority of 
two-thirds of the votes, with the exception of 
so-called ‘sensitive’ subjects, for which una-
nimity is required (the Supreme Eurasian Eco-
nomic Council defines the list of sensitive sub-
jects). Each decision of the College taken by 
a qualified majority of votes may be vetoed 
by a member country and become the subject 
of debate at the prime ministerial or presiden-
tial level (cf. Article 30 of the EEU Commission 
Statute). Decisions of the Supreme Eurasian Eco-
nomic Council prevail over the decisions of the 
Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, and the 
decisions of both these institutions prevail over 
the decisions of the Commission. The Court of 
the Eurasian Economic Union, headquartered 
in Minsk, is in charge of resolving disputes and 
guaranteeing the parties’ compliance with the 
agreements signed. 
The member states implement the decisions 
of both the EEU Councils “in keeping with the 
order established by their internal legislation” 
(Article 6 p.1 of the EEU treaty), which in prac-
tice means that those decisions become bind-
ing on the day of publication. The Commission’s 
decisions become binding in the same way. 
Based on the practice of integration hitherto, we 
may expect that legislation will take place at the 
level of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Coun-
cil (Supreme Council), and that the decisions 
of the remaining bodies will be of an executive 
and technical nature. This means that the deci-
sion-making process in the EEU will take place 
at the highest level and may be blocked under 
national legislation because of the lack of pre-
cision of the provisions of the EEU agreements; 
for instance, different interpretations of the vet-
erinary and sanitary rules are possible, and on 
this basis Russia banned the transit of meat to 
Kazakhstan via its territory in November 2014.
All this means that integration will in fact be 
limited to co-operation at the highest politi-
cal level, and the Commission will continue to 
play a technical role. At first sight, this would 
seem to strengthen the member states because 
The integration will in fact be limited to 
co-operation at the highest political level, 
and the Commission will continue to play 
a technical role.
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the Supreme Council’s decisions are taken by 
consensus, which in theory offers the weak-
est partners the possibility of blocking those 
solutions that are unfavourable to them. This 
was a concession from Russia intended to en-
courage other states to join the integration 
project. However, this solution necessitates 
frequent presidential summits (Supreme Coun-
cil meetings)8, which in turn enables Russia 
to pressure the weaker members political-
ly and force them to agree to decisions con-
ceived by the Russian-dominated Commission9.
The EEU institutions, and especially the Supreme 
Council, thus form a network of dependencies 
that entangle the member states, forcing them 
to accept closer co-operation with Russia. The 
Kremlin also seeks to use them to impose its 
own will with regard to political issues that for-
mally remain beyond the EEU’s remit10. In this 
context, the establishment of the EEU epitomis-
es the on-going process whereby Moscow has 
been subjugating the former CIS countries. 
The nature of the political systems in the mem-
ber states also affects the character of integra-
tion: all of them are authoritarian countries in 
which the principles of the rule of law and the 
activities of public institutions are instrumental-
8 In 2011 and 2012, the Supreme Council met twice 
a year; in 2013 it met on three occasions, and in 2014 
four meetings were held. 
9 For instance, Russia has forced the other EEU members 
to accept the inclusion of Armenia in the integration pro-
cess. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has complained 
about the role of Russian officials in the Commission, 
accusing them of acting in the interest of Russia and of 
providing documents to the Kazakh side only hours be-
fore they were due to be signed. 
10 For instance to take a common position on the Ukrainian 
crisis, of which the holding of the August 2014 meeting 
in Minsk in the EU-EEU format was an example.
ised, and the power of the authoritarian lead-
ership is what matters most. The same model 
governs relations within the EEU. For that rea-
son, and despite the fact that the EEU is mod-
elled on the European institutional setup11 (to 
the extent that the names of the institutions 
are similar12), the practice of integration to date 
shows that the Eurasian Economic Union is not 
a symmetrical reflection of the European Union, 
and any similarities are illusory. The experience 
of mutual relations within the Customs Union 
and the Common Economic Space also shows 
that the legal regulations of the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union are often evaded (e.g. by creating 
non-tariff barriers) or even ignored by its mem-
bers. The differences in the interpretations of 
veterinary regulations by the competent bodies 
of individual states, the fact that the Kremlin 
did not notify the member states of its decision 
to impose anti-Western sanctions, Russia’s uni-
lateral banning of the transit of goods to Ka-
zakhstan, and Russia’s introduction of restric-
tions on imports from Belarus are all examples 
of this. They show that compliance with the 
provisions of the EEU treaties is only a matter of 
the member states’ political decisions.13
11 In a policy article published in Izvestia on 3 October 2011, 
Vladimir Putin pointed to the need to “creatively apply the 
Schengen Treaty” in the integration process, and argued 
that the speed of European integration was comparable to 
that of Eurasian integration; http://izvestia.ru/news/502761 
In popular science articles, the EEU is presented as an or-
ganisation modelled on the EU; see Wikipedia.
12 The European Council, the European Commission, the EU 
Council and the European Court of Justice are meant to be 
the equivalents of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, 
the Eurasian Economic Commission, the Eurasian Intergov-
ernmental Council and the EEU Court respectively. Like the 
EU, the EEU ensures ‘free movement of people, capital ser-
vices and goods’. Despite the absence of an institutional basis 
in the EEU treaty, the Eurasian Development Bank (created in 
2006) serves as an investment bank of the EEU. It has been 
‘harnessed’ to serve the EEU’s objectives through the adop-
tion of certain rules and regulations to govern its activities.
13 A telling example of this practice occurred when Kazakh-
stan banned the imports of Russian alcoholic products 
(on the grounds that the required information was not 
provided on the labels) and lifted the ban three days lat-
er, immediately after a telephone conversation between 
Nazarbayev and Putin. The Belarusian president Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka said on 29 December 2014 that the methods 
employed by Russia to curb Belarusian imports were “of an 
administrative nature and illegal”. 
The practice of integration to date shows 
that the Eurasian Economic Union is not 
a symmetrical reflection of the European 
Union, and any similarities are illusory.
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Russia’s political tool
Because it is dominated by Russia, the EEU14 is 
the Kremlin’s instrument for pursuing its own 
political objectives in its relations with both 
foreign partners and the post-Soviet states.
Russia has been trying to promote the Eurasian 
Economic Union as an equal partner in dia-
logue with the European Union, this sending 
a signal that the EEU should be the main player 
in defining the shape of relations between the 
post-Soviet states on the one hand, and the EU15 
and China on the other. As a result, the other 
member states’ participation in the EEU hinders 
the development of their own relations with 
the West and China by restricting their ability 
to pursue dialogue with them (e.g. Armenia’s 
membership of the EEU means that the country 
cannot sign an association agreement with the 
EU). Russia is also using the EEU to demonstrate 
that it still has allies in its on-going confronta-
tion with the West. The format of the August 
talks on the Ukrainian crisis, held in Minsk, in-
directly proves this: it was a dialogue on the 
consequences of Ukraine’s signature of the As-
sociation Agreement with the EU, conducted 
between representatives of the EU and the EEU. 
Russia also tends to use the creation of the Eur-
asian Economic Union to strengthen its narra-
tive about the need to revise the international 
order and promote a multipolar world while 
rejecting US dominance. The Eurasian Economic 
Union is being represented as a bridge between 
China and the EU, one that is necessary for the 
establishment of a single economic area span-
14 Initially, the EEU was supposed to be called the Eurasian 
Union. That term had been coined by Vladimir Putin in 
his policy article on integration (cf. footnote 11). How-
ever, under pressure from Kazakhstan, in the end the 
organisation was officially named the Eurasian Econom-
ic Union – to emphasise the economic dimension of the 
project, which was an important point for Astana. 
15 The talks on the Ukrainian crisis held in Minsk in August 
2014 between the EU and the emerging EEU were an 
example of this approach. 
ning Europe and Asia. Such a bridge would be 
helpful in Russia’s efforts to undermine co-oper-
ation between the EU and the USA16. In this con-
text, Russia is interested in selected elements of 
the Chinese concept of the New Silk Route, such 
as the development of infrastructural connec-
tions between China and the EU via the terri-
tory of the Eurasian Economic Union. The EEU 
member states, and Russia in particular, would 
then reap the benefits from transit, and the 
EEU would become a relatively permanent ele-
ment in the China-EU economic co-operation. 
In the post-Soviet area, the Eurasian Economic 
Union is one of a number of tools that Russia is 
using to subjugate those countries which be-
long to what Russia identifies as its sphere of 
influence, and isolate them from other poten-
tial partners. The way Armenia was forced to 
reject the Association Agreement with the EU 
in order to join the EEU (in September 2013) is 
a case in point; other examples include the in-
vitations extended to Azerbaijan and Tajikistan 
to join the EEU, and the recent suggestions that 
Uzbekistan should join the organisation. In the 
sphere of security, the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) serves a similar purpose. 
The EEU also serves as a platform for Russia to 
promote the concept of Eurasianism and the 
16 Cf. Marek Menkiszak, ‘Greater Europe. Putin’s Vision of Eu-
ropean (Dis)integration’, OSW Studies, October 2013, www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2013-10-14/great-
er-europe-putins-vision-european-dis-integration
In the post-Soviet area, the Eurasian 
Economic Union is one of a number of 
tools that Russia is using to subjugate 
those countries which belong to what 
Russia identifies as its sphere of in-
fluence, and isolate them from other 
potential partners.
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civilisational primacy of Russia and the Rus-
sian language and culture in the post-Soviet 
area (Russian is the sole official language of 
the EEU)17. This manifests itself in the Russian 
initiatives to establish Eurasian information 
platforms and Eurasian forums, in the way ed-
ucational and research institutions are promot-
ing the concept18 and in the calls for a greater 
role of the Russian language in the post-Soviet 
states19. The member states view this policy as a 
threat, and believe that it indirectly undermines 
their sovereignty. This has already provoked 
criticism of the EEU within its member states’ 
nationalist circles, and also within its business 
associations, which have been emphasising the 
need to defend the interests of Kazakhstan and 
Belarus (their voices can be heard in public me-
dia). This aversion and fears of Russian domi-
nance are reflected in the fact that the presi-
dents of Kazakhstan and Belarus have recently 
been anxious to emphasise their independent 
status in relations with Russia20. 
17 Cf. Marek Menkiszak, ‘The Putin doctrine: The formation 
of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the 
post-Soviet area’, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikac-
je/osw-commentary/2014-03-27/putin-doctrine-forma-
tion-a-conceptual-framework-russian
18 Examples include the activities of the Kazakh affiliate of 
the Lomonosov University in Moscow, which includes 
organising research forums on subjects such as ‘Kazakh-
stan and the idea of Eurasianism in the new world’, and 
the establishment of the Dostyk-Druzhba research and 
education centre for Eurasian culture, http://www.msu.
kz/information/detail.php?ID=975&sphrase_id=17. Also, 
the activities of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National Uni-
versity in Kazakhstan, including the creation in 2009 of 
the Chair of Eurasian Studies and the Eurasia research 
centre. The university also runs the website http://www.
eurasianism.enu.kz/ru/, which promotes the idea of Eur-
asianism and identifies Nazarbayev as its architect.
19 For example, see the article by Ilya Namirov titled ‘Russ-
kiy vopros v Kazakhstane’, published by the Stolete 
news portal, 11 December 2014, http://www.stoletie.ru/
vzglyad/russkij_vopros_v_kazahstane_620.htm
20 For instance, in a TV interview in August 2014, Kazakh-
stan’s president Nursultan Nazarbayev suggested that 
Kazakhstan could quit the EEU if membership did not 
serve the country’s interests. 
Prospects: a stick rather than a carrot
The functioning of the Eurasian Economic 
Union will depend primarily on Russia, as the 
country most interested in its continued exis-
tence and having the economic potential to 
subsidise the economies of the other member 
states. Russia is the driving force behind the 
integration process, and its aim is to integrate 
more in those areas in which that benefits Rus-
sia, as evidenced by the Russian plans to intro-
duce a common currency or create an EEU par-
liament21. The other founding members of the 
EEU do not support those plans, and have been 
increasingly delaying or feigning integration.
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are second-rank mem-
bers who are not in a position to oppose Russia, 
and who treat their participation in the EEU as 
a political necessity, but also as an opportuni-
ty to gain subsidies to support their inefficient 
economies. On the other hand, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus fear the political dimension of integra-
tion, and are concerned that their room for 
manoeuvre in foreign policy could shrink. This 
means that if the position of Russia weakens, 
the EEU may become increasingly dysfunctional 
and transform into something like today’s Com-
monwealth of Independent States, whose sig-
nificance is purely symbolic. 
In the short term, the greatest challenge for the 
EEU states will concern the worsening econom-
ic situation in Russia and, consequently, mount-
ing economic problems in Kazakhstan and Be-
larus in particular (which will be the result not 
so much of the two countries’ membership in
21 The Chairman of the Duma, Sergey Naryshkin, also 
raised the question of creating an EEU parliament 
during his visit to Kazakhstan in November 2014. A ban 
on settlements in euros and dollars and an acceleration 
of work on a common currency have been proposed in 
the draft concept paper on the development of the EEU 
member states’ payment systems; cf. http://izvestia.ru/
news/580112 
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the EEU as of the scale of their economic links 
to Russia). Russia may take advantage of eco-
nomic instability in those countries to control 
them more tightly, as economic problems will 
undermine the existing rules of play whereby 
the authoritarian leader gets support in return 
for guaranteeing economic stability. From the 
point of view of the political elites in the EEU 
member states, closer co-operation with Rus-
sia, institutionalised in the EEU format, may 
make it easier for the Kremlin to enforce politi-
cal obedience.
